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FOREWORD
THE FUTURE OF FEDERALISM, FROM THE BOTTOM UP
Anthony Johnstone*
I. INTRODUCTION
This issue records the Montana Law Review’s 2014 Hon. James R.
Browning Symposium, The Future of Federalism: What Will Be Retained,
and What Surrendered?1 The Symposium takes its title from then-Justice
Harlan Fiske Stone’s opinion for the Supreme Court in United States v.
Darby,2 in which he writes the Tenth Amendment “states but a truism that
all is retained which has not been surrendered.”3 At first glance, this is an
odd inspiration for a discussion about the future of federalism. After all, of
those powers retained and surrendered, most of them were retained and sur-
rendered formally with the ratification of the Constitution around 1789, 150
years before the Darby case and more than 220 years before this Sympo-
sium.4 On closer consideration, however, the exchange implicit in the quo-
* Associate Professor, The University of Montana School of Law. Thanks to the Montana Law
Review editors for organizing an excellent symposium, to the panelists for their thoughtful presentations,
and to my family for their support.
1. Symposium, The Future of Federalism: What Will be Retained, and What Surrendered? 76
Mont. L. Rev. (2015).
2. 312 U.S. 100 (1940).
3. Id. at 124. This reading of the Tenth Amendment persists in the Supreme Court’s more recent
federalism cases. N.Y. v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (“If a power is delegated to Congress in the
Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a
power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the
Constitution has not conferred on Congress. It is in this sense that the Tenth Amendment ‘states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.’” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
4. The exceptions are the subsequent constitutional amendments that surrendered additional pow-
ers to the federal government. See e.g. U.S. Const. amend. XIV (granting Congress, and by implication
the federal courts, the power to enforce the civil rights guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment); U.S.
1
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tation continues today, and is sufficiently dynamic to merit the title’s use of
the future tense. In the practice of federalism, what is retained or reserved
by the states and what is surrendered or delegated to the federal government
is subject to constant renegotiation. The Darby case itself marked what
some commentators consider a “surrender” in the primary sense of that
word as the Supreme Court acquiesced in the New Deal’s expansion of
central power.5 Other commentators view Darby as one constitutional
revolution eventually countered by a more recent constitutional revolution,
still occurring, that is retaking some of the federalist ground that was sur-
rendered.6 The future of federalism is, indeed, an open question.
This foreword considers the Symposium participants’ contributions in
three groups before making concluding points. Part I begins theoretically,
with Professor Ilya Somin’s reframing of federalism’s primary value as po-
litical freedom actualized by “foot voting” and Professor Roderick Hills’s
proposed method of allocating rights and powers between jurisdictions. It
then turns to three case studies of federalism in action at the state and tribal
level: Professor Michelle Bryan’s examination of hotly contested federal
land use decisions; Assistant United States Attorney Danna Jackson’s report
on the implementation of federally restored tribal criminal jurisdiction over
domestic violence cases; and Professor Matthew Fletcher’s study of tribal
disruption as a strategy for negotiating with—and possibly a sovereignty-
vindicating model for—state and local governments. It concludes with two
state responses to the federal government and their consequences, Professor
Robert Mikos’s proposal for state indemnification of federal criminal de-
fense costs, and Professor Abigail Moncrieff’s and Jonathan Dinerstein’s
prediction that states’ victory over conditional spending might lose them
more autonomy than they won. Part II draws on these contributions to de-
velop a tentative model of states as more complicated than often portrayed
in federalism discussions. Each state is a “they,” not an “it,” at least as
much and probably more than the federal government,7 and future analysis
of federalism might more accurately account for this. This foreword con-
Const. amend. XVI (granting Congress the power to lay and collect income taxes); U.S. Const. amends.
XV, XIX, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI (granting Congress, and by implication the federal courts, the power to
enforce voting rights).
5. See Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1387, 1449
(1987) (“What failed in Darby was not the language of the Constitution, but the willingness of the
Justices to accept the theory of limited government upon which it rested.”).
6. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 Va. L.
Rev. 1045, 1051 (2001).
7. See e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent As Oxymo-
ron, 12 Intl. Rev. L. & Econ. 239 (1992); Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Interpre-
tive Theory and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. Contemp. Leg. Issues 549 (2005); Neomi Rao, Public
Choice and International Law Compliance: The Executive Branch Is a “They,” Not an “It”, 96 Minn.
L. Rev. 194 (2011).
2
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2015 THE FUTURE OF FEDERALISM 3
cludes that whatever is retained or surrendered, the future of federalism will
be more complicated and more durable than either side of current debates
anticipates.
II. FEDERALISM SEEN FROM THE BOTTOM UP
The distinctive contributions made by the following authors are not
what questions they ask about federalism, but where and to whom they ask
them. Yet more of the discourse about federalism has centered on the fed-
eral government than on the states. The great federalism battles commonly
play out between the Supreme Court and Congress as represented by the
federal executive.8 While it usually takes a state or local official, and occa-
sionally a private citizen, to get a case going, by the time a federalism ques-
tion is argued and decided the state itself recedes into abstraction. The writ-
ings in this issue bring the states, and the Indian tribes as separate sover-
eigns in our federal system, back into the foreground.
A. Why Federalism, and When?
Two keynote contributors bookended the Symposium’s proceedings.
The opening keynote by Professor Somin sets the agenda by proposing a
new way to understand a primary value of federalism as sustaining the con-
ditions necessary for the effective exercise of political freedom through
“foot voting.”9 The conventional account of voting as the core component
of political freedom neglects its inefficacy. A voter has less than a one-in-
sixty-million chance of deciding a presidential election, odds that do not
improve much in other elections. Even then, the choice is almost always
between two candidates who each represent a particular aggregation of pref-
erences that the party system produces for that election cycle, and in ideal
circumstances those preferences only roughly align with a single hypotheti-
cal median voter.10 Professor Somin observes such long odds would be in-
tolerable for the meaningful exercise of other basic constitutional rights
such as religious freedom.
This is all the more troubling because voting long has been “regarded
as a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.”11
Worse, due in part to the low stakes for any particular vote, actual voters
are rationally ignorant about politics––that is, they persistently lack infor-
8. See e.g. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2659 (2012).
9. Ilya Somin, Democracy, Foot Voting, and the Case for Limiting Federal Power, 76 Mont. L.
Rev. 21 (2015).
10. See generally Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 283
(2014).
11. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
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mation to make sufficiently informed political decisions. Consequently,
Professor Somin argues, “Your chances of exercising genuinely meaningful
freedom are much greater when you vote with your feet than when you vote
at the ballot box.”12 If “foot voting” is a more effective means than ballot
box voting to valuable ends of political freedom, “we should decentralize
political power to lower levels of government” through stronger judicial
enforcement of constitutional federalism.13
How far this decentralization should proceed, and for which issues, is
an open question. Professor Hills proposes a tentative answer. He in-
troduces what he calls a “universal field theory” for structuring the relation-
ship between private rights and federalism, and suggests some considera-
tions for determining when federalism does and does not respect private
rights.14 He challenges the conventional understanding that federalism is
inversely related to private rights. That understanding is rooted in James
Madison’s concern that majority factions can more easily capture state gov-
ernments to entrench their interests at the expense of their fellow citizens’
liberties, while an enlarged national republic affords “greater security . . .
by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able
to outnumber and oppress the rest.”15 Drawing on Madison’s essays oppos-
ing the First Bank of the United States, Professor Hills balances Madison’s
concern with majority capture and oppression at the state level with
Madison’s equally important concern with minority capture and oppression
at the federal level. The federal government’s enabling of slavery is a par-
ticularly terrible example of minority factional capture at the national level
despite state resistance, and a historical counterpoint to Reconstruction’s
still-halting national effort to overcome majority factional capture at the
state level.16
Rather than adopting the Supreme Court’s simple thesis that “federal-
ism protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power,”17 however,
Professor Hills asks “which liberty?” and “whose power?” Some public
rights enable oppression by the privately powerful, and some public powers
enable vindication of private rights. He looks to the relative competency,
deliberation, and exit-and-voice constraints of state legislatures and Con-
12. Somin, supra n. 9, at 24.
13. Id. at 25.
14. Roderick Hills Jr., Towards a Universal Field Theory of Private Rights and Federalism, 76
Mont. L. Rev. 41, 55–56 (2015).
15. James Madison, The Federalist No. 10, in The Federalist, 64 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., Wesleyan U.
Press 1961).
16. Hills, supra n. 14, at 47–48. See also Somin, supra n. 9, at 36 (“Before the Civil War, the
federal government did a lot more to promote slavery that to restrict it,” and “also tended to do more to
promote racial segregation than to restrict it.”).
17. Bond v. U.S., 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011).
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gress, and is guided by Madison’s insights into the dual tyrannies of the
majority and the minority. He then tentatively concludes that federalism
best promotes liberty when national rights protect against majority faction-
alism in the states (such as moralizing legislation), and when federalism
protects against minority factionalism in the federal government (such as
monopolizing legislation). While Professor Hills’s theory may or may not
explain the current state of federalism and rights doctrine as a descriptive
matter, it provides a powerful set of normative arguments—with an impec-
cable Madisonian pedigree—to clarify the stakes for the continued develop-
ment of federalism doctrine as a safeguard of liberty.
B. Where, and How, Federalism Matters
While there is more work to be done with the theory of federalism, the
practice of federalism deserves much more attention than it has received.
This is all the more true of federalism as it is practiced outside the mislead-
ing dualism of federal and state governments. Nearly two decades ago,
Philip Frickey corrected the conventional understanding of dual sover-
eignty, noting that “although sovereignty created by the United States Con-
stitution is indeed dual, sovereignty within the United States is triadic:
American Indian tribes have sovereignty as well.”18 This Symposium issue
covers all three sides of the triangle: state-federal relations, tribal-federal
relations, and tribal-state relations. The state stories add a further dimension
of local governments, where overlapping jurisdictional conflicts are most
concrete.
Some of today’s most heated debates over federalism occur on the
ground, literally. Professor Bryan investigates the underexplored relation-
ship between federal and local land use planners.19 At a time of increasingly
vocal calls for state and local control of federal lands, Professor Bryan pro-
poses that federal agencies and local governments “learn both directions”
about more collaborative land management decision making. Public land
use management presents challenging federalism questions that recently
have generated more heat than light. It is easy to see why, given the close
links between sovereignty and territoriality. There are few more concrete
manifestations of federal power than its control over and around federal
lands, where “Congress exercises the powers both of a proprietor and of a
legislature . . . .”20 Yet a federal role in land use planning also raises recur-
18. Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 31, 31 (1996).
19. Michelle Bryan, Learning Both Directions: How Better Federal-Local Land Use Collaboration
Can Quiet the Call for Federal Lands Transfers, 76 Mont. L. Rev. 147 (2015).
20. Kleppe v. N.M., 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976).
5
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ring questions about the limits of federal power in areas of traditional state
concern such as land use regulation.21
In a recent planning process for the C. M. Russell Wildlife Refuge, a
place comprising more than a million acres of federal land sited along the
Missouri River in North Central Montana amidst more than a dozen federal,
state, and local jurisdictions, Professor Bryan finds missteps on both sides
of the federal–local fence. They range from tone-deaf federal agents who
neglect to find a seat at the table for the people who must live with the
federal decisions, to quixotic local officeholders who try through county
resolutions to resurrect issues decided by the Supreme Court a century22 or
two23 ago. Her collaborative response embraces the territoriality of these
disputes, turning the participants away from political abstractions as players
in divisive national debates and toward personal interactions as neighbors
on shared Montana landscapes.
Ms. Jackson offers another timely lesson about collaboration on tri-
bal–federal negotiations in the notoriously complicated area of tribal crimi-
nal jurisdiction.24 There are many policy areas in which federalism tolerates
vast and occasionally arbitrary variation among jurisdictions, even in areas
with high stakes for life, liberty, and property like criminal law and sentenc-
ing.25 As Ms. Jackson explains, however, such variation may become intol-
erable when the jurisdictions involved overlap, and the criminal laws at
issue protect the same class of victims in Indian Country against domestic
violence at the hands of two different classes of perpetrators. At this late
point in tribal–federal relations, it would be difficult to characterize these
criminal jurisdictional variations on reservations as reflecting any coherent
21. Compare Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 284–285
(1981) (reversing a district court’s opinion that the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1997 “contravenes the Tenth Amendment because it interferes with the States’ ‘traditional governmental
function’ of regulating land use”) with Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 173 (2001) (rejecting an agency interpretation of the Clean Water Act where it
would “permit encroachment upon a traditional state power” of land use regulation).
22. See Camfield v. U.S., 167 U.S. 518, 525–526 (1897) (“The general government doubtless has a
power over its own property analogous to the police power of the several states . . . . A different rule
would place the public domain of the United States completely at the mercy of state legislation.”).
23. See M’Culloch v. Md., 17 U.S. 316, 429 (1819) (“The sovereignty of a state extends to every-
thing which exists by its own authority, or is introduced by its permission; but does it extend to those
means which are employed by congress to carry into execution powers conferred on that body by the
people of the United States? We think it demonstrable, that it does not. Those powers are not given by
the people of a single state. They are given by the people of the United States, to a government whose
laws, made in pursuance of the constitution, are declared to be supreme. Consequently, the people of a
single state cannot confer a sovereignty which will extend over them.”).
24. Danna R. Jackson, Cooperative (and Uncooperative) Federalism at Tribal, State, and Local
Levels: A Case for Cooperative Charging Decisions in Indian Country, 76 Mont. L. Rev. 127 (2015).
25. See Robert A. Mikos, Indemnification as an Alternative to Interposition, 76 Mont. L. Rev. 57,
59–68 (2015) (explaining how state variations in criminal law and procedure depart from the uniformity
of federal criminal laws, but better express the policy preferences of each state jurisdiction).
6
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set of federalism values, whether framed as liberty, accountability, auton-
omy, or experimentation.26 In the sphere of Indian law, as Philip Frickey
put it: “‘Our Federalism’ came about through our colonialism.”27 Thus de-
veloped through a long history of Congressional, judicial, and executive
(including military) interactions with Indian nations, “[f]ederal Indian law
is . . . rooted in the fundamental contradiction between the historical fact
and continuing realities of colonization, on the one hand, and the constitu-
tional themes of limited government, democracy, inclusion, and fairness.”28
Congress recently resolved one contradiction into slightly more coher-
ence with the restoration of tribal jurisdiction over domestic violence
crimes in the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013.29
With dual overlapping criminal jurisdiction over a critical set of cases, co-
ordination between federal and tribal prosecutors is essential to the Act’s
efficacy. The United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Montana
has a plan to communicate with tribal officials and assess relevant law en-
forcement resources; though as Ms. Jackson’s title contemplates, it remains
to be seen whether the relationship between these two sovereigns will
model cooperative or uncooperative federalism. Notwithstanding this op-
portunity for cooperation among the federal and tribal legislative and exec-
utive branches, the Supreme Court may also render its own judgment for or
against this new federalism.30
In contrast to these collaborative approaches to federalism, Professor
Fletcher documents discord, albeit a constructive form of discord, in the
fraught triangle of relationships among Indian nations and the federal gov-
ernment and the states.31 Indian tribes are “domestic dependent nations”32
with distinct constitutional status that rely on the United States as trustee,
but also reserve from the federal government their pre-constitutional “inher-
26. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Disruption and Federalism, 76 Mont. L. Rev. 97, 123–124
(2015) (listing among “the well-established values of federalism: (1) checks and balances against actual
tyranny; (2) democratic participation and accountability; (3) local autonomy; and (4) problem-solving
capacity.”).
27. Frickey, supra n. 18, at 31 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)).
28. Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpre-
tation in Federal Indian Law, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 381, 384 (1993).
29. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (2013)
(codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
30. Cf. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (argu-
ing that regulation of “domestic relations,” a traditional area of state concern, is beyond the scope of the
Indian Commerce Clause); see also U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (partially invalidating
the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, and “reject[ing] the argument that Congress may regulate
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate
commerce.”).
31. Fletcher, supra n. 26.
32. Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
7
Johnstone: The Future of Federalism, from the Bottom Up
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2015
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\76-1\MON110.txt unknown Seq: 8 20-APR-15 17:17
8 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 76
ent sovereign authority over their members and territories.”33 States also are
separate sovereigns that preceded the Constitution and rely on the United
States government for their “common Defence” and “general Welfare,”34
but also reserve powers over “all the objects, which, in the ordinary course
of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people; and the
internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.”35 Despite these
similarities between tribes and states, and their parallel struggles to negoti-
ate spheres of sovereignty with respect to the federal government, for centu-
ries they have opposed each other in fundamental and sometimes tragic
jurisdictional conflicts.36
Professor Fletcher considers some of these more recent conflicts to
discover what states, long assumed to be the “deadliest enemies” of Indian
nations, might learn about federalism from peoples who “lived through fed-
eral tyranny of a kind contemporary Americans would not believe.”37 Re-
orienting the Indian-federal-state triangle, he describes how tribal disruption
through the assertion of historically just but contemporarily disruptive fed-
eral legal claims can sometimes succeed in vindicating Indian sovereign
interests against states, or at least facilitate fairer negotiations over those
interests with states.  The tribal disruption strategy resembles what Jessica
Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken call “uncooperative federalism,” the
way states resist federal power from within by leveraging interdependence
in policy implementation, rather than by delineating bright lines between
sovereign spheres.38 Treaties and the Tenth Amendment recognize that In-
dian tribes and states, respectively, are formally sovereign in the constitu-
tional order, yet due to a variety of centripetal forces both are functionally
dependent on the central government.39 Professor Fletcher’s disruption the-
33. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomie Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991).
34. U.S. Const. preamble; U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States”).
35. James Madison, The Federalist No. 45, in The Federalist, supra n. 15, at 313.
36. Chief Justice John Marshall put the conflict starkly in Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15 (“[t]his
bill is brought by the Cherokee nation, praying an injunction to restrain the state of Georgia from the
execution of certain laws of that state, which, as is alleged, go directly to annihilate the Cherokees as a
political society, and to seize, for the use of Georgia, the lands of the nation which have been assured to
them by the United States in solemn treaties repeatedly made and still in force.”).
37. Fletcher, supra n. 26, at 125.
38. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 Yale L.J. 1256,
1258–1259 (2009).
39. As Professor Fletcher notes, some commentators point to the Sixteenth Amendment’s constitu-
tional confirmation of the federal income tax, and the resulting increase in federal spending power with
strings attached, as a leading force for centralization. The Supreme Court recently observed the same.
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2659 (“The formidable [conditional spending] power, if not checked in any way,
would present a grave threat to the system of federalism created by our Constitution.”). Professor Mon-
crieff and Mr. Dinerstein observe in this volume, “The national government has used its expanding
spending power to touch every arena of modern law and policy, and its money comes with strings
8
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ory, like uncooperative federalism, plays an increasingly important role for
such second-best sovereigns as tribes and states.
C. What Are the States’ Next Moves?
While there can be value in uniformity of criminal law within a single
territory, the expansive reach of federal crimes nationally denies states op-
portunities to permit conduct in line with state policies (such as marijuana
use), to provide enhanced criminal procedural protections consistent with
more responsive state constitutions and laws (such as rights of privacy), and
to punish crimes less harshly according to local values (such as abolition of
the death penalty). A notable example of these concerns in Montana is
United States v. Rothacher.40 In that case, federal prosecutors charged the
defendant as a felon in possession of firearms “even though,” according to
the district court, the state had “seemingly dealt with the enormity of the
crime,” including a probation violation based on the same possession of
firearms.41 The federal district court explained, “Were the decision mine to
make on first impression, I would dismiss the case because it is hard to
make the Interstate Commerce Clause nexus in a principled way.”42 Con-
ceding that existing precedent foreclosed such a resolution, the court still
noted “the details of Rothacher’s dual prosecution, especially the general
federalization of criminal law has structural appeal” on equitable grounds.43
“[W]hat is the federal interest in this prosecution,” the court concluded,
“other than one more statistic?”44
Professor Mikos catalogs the harm done to federalism values by this
vast federalization of criminal law.45 In response to what he, and even some
federal judges, consider federal overreach in criminal law, Professor Mikos
proposes a novel form of what might be called disruption. Instead of futile
attempts to nullify federal criminal law, Professor Mikos suggests states
indemnify federal criminal defendants. He concedes the limitations of in-
demnification, but his proposal offers an important clarification of the fed-
attached.” Abigail R. Moncrieff & Jonathan Dinerstein, Student Author, Will Uncooperative Federalism
Survive NFIB? 76 Mont. L. Rev. 75, 75 (2015). This is especially true of federal control over tribal
governments. While federal funding is a substantial share of the average state budget, it accounts for a
large majority of the average tribal budget. See Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians, A Call to Honor the
Promises to Tribal Nations in the Federal Budget (April 19, 2013) (available at http://perma.cc/2MBY-
36KG) (comparing the 24.9% of state and local government revenue from federal support to the 61.2%
of reservation government revenue from federal support).
40. U.S. v. Rothacher, 442 F. Supp. 2d 999 (D. Mont. 2006).
41. Id. at 1000.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 999 n. 5.
44. Id.
45. Mikos, supra n. 25.
9
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eralism stakes involved for both defendants and the states who “make[ ]
disingenuous attacks on federal law” and could benefit from “some skin in
the game.”46 Like his other work on novel forms of state resistance to fed-
eral criminal law, his proposal informs state-level discussions of the sub-
stantial costs of federalization and the real (although limited) benefits of
possible state responses.47
While the federalization of criminal law continues largely unchal-
lenged by the courts,48 the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010 met a different fate. Professor Moncrieff and Mr. Dinerstein survey
the federalism landscape after the Supreme Court limited the federal gov-
ernment’s conditional spending power in National Federation of Indepen-
dent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB).49 Writing for a three-Justice plurality and
joined in the judgment by four dissenters, Chief Justice Roberts held “Con-
gress may offer the States grants and require the States to comply with
accompanying conditions, but the States must have a genuine choice
whether to accept the offer.”50 This gives the states what Professor Mon-
crieff and Mr. Dinerstein call “an unusually large bargaining chip in unco-
operative federalism negotiations,”51 while depriving “national bureaucrats
. . . a significant amount of their bargaining power in federal administrative
negotiations.”52
46. Id.
47. See Anthony Johnstone, Commandeering Information (and Informing the Commandeered), 161
U. Pa. L. Rev. Online 205 (2013) (responding to Robert A. Mikos, Can the States Keep Secrets from the
Federal Government?, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 103 (2012)).
48. Compare U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (holding unconstitutional, as exceeding the
reach of the interstate commerce power, the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 due in part to the lack
of a “jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm posses-
sion in question affects interstate commerce”) with U.S. v. Dorsey, 418 F.3d 1038, 1045–1046 (9th Cir.
2005) (holding constitutional, as within the reach of the interstate commerce power, the Gun Free
School Zones Act as amended in 1996 because “the addition of the jurisdictional element, which re-
quires that the firearm ‘has moved in or [ ] otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce’ repairs the
constitutional shortfalls announced in Lopez.”).
49. Moncrieff & Dinerstein, supra n. 39.
50. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2608 (plurality).
51. Moncrieff & Dinerstein, supra n. 39, at 88.
52. Id. at 59 (Professor Moncrieff and Mr. Dinerstein understate the importance of fiscal constraints
when they call the Court’s distinction between the commerce and spending powers “nonsensical.” Even
with relatively lax constraints on the federal fiscal budget due to deficit spending, the exercise of the
spending power exacts a definite cost on the federal government relative to direct regulation. They
acknowledge this when they describe the federal move from conditional spending to conditional pre-
emption, when agencies “will find the resources they need to implement national programs (or will
decrease national regulation to conserve resources).” Id. at 93. The NFIB dissent elaborates on these
constraints, noting “[t]he principal practical obstacle that prevents Congress from using the tax-and-
spend power to assume all the general-welfare responsibilities traditionally exercised by the States is the
sheer impossibility of managing a Federal Government large enough to administer such a system.”
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2643 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). In the dissent’s discussion
of the taxing power, they also note the related constraint that spending must (eventually) be supported
by taxes, which “have never been popular.” Id. at 2655. It is an accurate observation, at least in the
10
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Yet the confluence of this ruling with two “sleeper” cases suggesting
enforceability of spending conditions against the federal government under
the Administrative Procedure Act,53 and barring the enforceability, absent
clear statutory provisions, of spending conditions against the states,54 may
challenge federal agencies administering conditional spending programs on
two fronts. If the federal agency is too flexible when negotiating Congres-
sional spending conditions with states, it may face administrative litigation
from private beneficiaries of those conditions, but if the federal agency is
too rigid in its enforcement of Congressional spending conditions on the
private beneficiaries’ behalf, it may face constitutional litigation from the
states. The number of federal programs that might need to navigate this
dilemma is uncertain since administrative challenges to spending conditions
are untested and the Supreme Court has not “‘fix[ed] the outermost line’
where persuasion gives way to coercion” in conditional spending.55 Be-
tween the dilemma’s horns, Professor Moncrieff and Mr. Dinerstein argue
NFIB gives Congress a powerful new incentive to substitute its general con-
ditional spending power under the General Welfare clause with its nearly-
as-broad conditional preemption power under the Commerce and
Supremacy clauses. Given how federalism values motivated the Court in
NFIB, this is a perverse result in which “[t]he New Federalism era . . .
creates an incentive for the national government to flex its own muscles
more, not less.”56
III. A STATE IS A “THEY,” NOT AN “IT.”
The contributors to this issue offer multiple perspectives on federalism
as it operates from the bottom up. Interactions of the federal and state gov-
contemporary political environment, that “legislators must weigh the need for the tax against the terrible
price they might pay at their next election” Id. at 2655.).
53. Gonzaga U. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002) (holding “if Congress wishes to create new rights
enforceable under § 1983, it must do so in clear and unambiguous terms—no less and no more than
what is required for Congress to create new rights enforceable under an implied private right of ac-
tion.”).
54. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2012) (suggesting “the [Admin-
istrative Procedure Act] would likely permit respondents to obtain an authoritative judicial determina-
tion of the merits of their legal claim” that the federal agency’s approval of state implementation violates
federal spending conditions).
55. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606 (plurality). In a recent amicus brief on behalf of several professors and
advocacy groups, Professor Moncrieff attempts to clarify the anti-coercion line in a pending case that
once again considers the Affordable Care Act. See Amici Curiae Br. of the Jewish Alliance for Law &
Social Action et al., King v. Burwell, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/sup
reme_court_preview/BriefsV4/14-114_amicus_resp_jalsa.authcheckdam.pdf at i–ii (No. 14-114, 135 S.
Ct. 475 (2015)) (arguing a reading of insurance exchange tax subsidy provisions that threatens states
with “Establish an exchange, or the federal government will destroy your individual insurance market
. . . plausibly violates both the principle of equal sovereignty and the anti- coercion constraint”).
56. Moncrieff & Dinerstein, supra n. 39, at 96.
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ernment in their overlapping jurisdictions create a dynamic Robert Schapiro
calls “polyphonic federalism.”57 Extended to the local level, where commu-
nities may enjoy even more solidarity and engage in even more effective
dissent than at the state level, this dynamic becomes what Heather Gerken
calls “federalism all the way down.”58 Recognition of these interactions
among the federal government, states, and localities spurred a more sophis-
ticated analysis of cooperative federalism, uncooperative federalism, and
the earlier convention of competitive federalism. These broader accounts
and the more specific accounts presented in this issue will play a central
role in the development of federalism’s future. Yet they play out mainly
along a vertical axis, from cities to county seats to state capitols and tribal
headquarters to Washington, D.C. and back, each level portrayed atomically
as an indivisible locality, state, tribe, or (less often) a monolithic federal
government. The model has the virtue of simplicity, but it is incomplete.
A major underappreciated distinction between the federal government
and the states (and to a lesser extent localities) is the diversity in state politi-
cal structures.59 State legislatures serve shorter terms and are arguably more
responsive to their electorates than Congress.60 State executives are divided
rather than unitary like the Presidency.61 Most state courts are elected.62
These structural distinctions can lead to substantive differences in how
states choose to negotiate or resist federal policies. These structural distinc-
tions also complicate, and perhaps undermine, some of the “accountability”
rationales in federalism doctrine. Examples arise in the states’ varied re-
sponses to the Supreme Court’s partial invalidation of the Medicaid Expan-
sion in NFIB.
A. Accountability and Choice in NFIB
Relatively early in the history of our federalism, in M’Culloch v. Ma-
ryland,63 Chief Justice John Marshall provided a lasting reminder of the
57. Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic Federalism (U. Chi. Press 2009).
58. Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (2010).
59. But see William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General,
and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 Yale L. J. 2446 (2006) (contrasting the state model of the
divided executive with the federal model of the unitary executive).
60. See e.g., Mont. Const. art. V, § 3 (“A member of the house of representatives shall be elected
for a term of two years and a member of the senate for a term of four years each to begin on a date
provided by law.”).
61. See e.g., id. at art. VI, § 1 (“The executive branch includes a governor, lieutenant governor,
secretary of state, attorney general, superintendent of public instruction, and auditor . . . . Each holds
office for a term of four years which begins on the first Monday of January next succeeding election,
and until a successor is elected and qualified.”).
62. See e.g., id. at art. VII, § 8 (“Supreme court justices and district court judges shall be elected by
the qualified electors as provided by law.”).
63. 17 U.S. 316.
12
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multiple sources of popular sovereignty in a federal system. When the peo-
ple act at the federal level, “they act in their states,” but “the measures they
adopt do not, on that account, cease to be the measures of the people them-
selves.”64 Chief Justice Marshall spoke of the constitutional ratification pro-
cess, but he could just as well be describing how the people act in their
states, and even through the mediation of state laws,65 to choose Congres-
sional delegations66 and presidential electors.67 Similarly, the people ex-
press their sovereignty through several distinct channels at the state level by
electing and empowering multiple state officials with competing duties to
legislate, execute, and adjudicate state policies. In federalism doctrine the
usual attention is on the vertical separation of the people’s “two political
capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the
other.”68 Federalism doctrine also should attend to the horizontal separation
of the people’s political capacities within the states.
The Court’s lack of attention to the states’ distinct political structures
weakens conventional rationales for certain federalism-promoting rules. Ac-
cording to the Court’s federalism doctrine, for example, the genius of dual
sovereignty also presents a danger of misplaced accountability. In order for
citizens to exercise their two political capacities properly, they must know
which government is acting on their behalf.69 When both government juris-
dictions overlap, as they often do in the post-New Deal constitutional re-
gime, bright lines such as the anti-commandeering rule need to be drawn to
preserve accountability. Maintaining accountability within these separate
spheres is a central theme of New York v. United States: “[W]here the Fed-
eral Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who
will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who
devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral
64. Id. at 403.
65. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof . . .”).
66. See id. at art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States . . .”); U.S. Const. amend. XVII (“The
Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people
thereof, for six years . . .”).
67. See id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which
the State may be entitled in the Congress . . .”).
68. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Fed-
eralism was our Nation’s own discovery. The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of
their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected
from incursion by the other. The resulting Constitution created a legal system unprecedented in form and
design, establishing two orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its
own set of mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it.”).
69. Professor Somin shows this is a dubious assumption given political ignorance, but it is an
assumption that motivates the Court’s federalism doctrine nonetheless. Somin, supra n. 9, at 38–39.
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ramifications of their decision.”70 The translation of this accountability
principle from an anti-commandeering rule to a more general anti-coercion
rule supported the crucial move in NFIB to invalidate the Medicaid expan-
sion. “Permitting the Federal Government to force the States to implement a
federal program would threaten the political accountability key to our fed-
eral system . . . when the State has no choice, the Federal Government can
achieve its objectives without accountability.”71 The solution to the ac-
countability problem is to give states a choice: “States may now choose to
reject the expansion; that is the whole point.”72
B. Choice and Accountability after NFIB
Now that the states have a choice to expand Medicaid, what did they
choose? Did their choices vindicate the accountability principle? The Court
considered the possibilities. “Some States may indeed decline to participate,
either because they are unsure they will be able to afford their share of the
new funding obligations, or because they are unwilling to commit the ad-
ministrative resources necessary to support the expansion.”73 Notably, the
Court did not consider the justification commonly offered that states are
unsure the federal government will be able to afford its share of the new
funding obligations. “Other States, however, may voluntarily sign up, find-
ing the idea of expanding Medicaid coverage attractive, particularly given
the level of federal funding the Act offers at the outset.”74 What is striking
about this discussion, and the Court’s federalism rhetoric more generally, is
the monolithic “state” that is the subject of its analysis. A “state” sued to
vindicate its sovereignty, a “state” won a choice to opt out of the Medicaid
expansion, a “state” either did or did not do so, and (thanks to the Court) a
“state” was accountable to the people for its choice. Despite the shorthand
commonly employed in federalism arguments, within a “state” these are all
different political actors, independently elected and accountable to the
state’s citizens in ways the Court does not consider.
70. 505 U.S at 169. This accountability concern can be overstated in the anti-commandeering con-
text, as demonstrated by Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898 (1997). Sheriff Jay Printz, himself an elected
official, did not need the Supreme Court to tell the gun buyers of his Ravalli County, Montana, who was
behind the Brady Act’s background checks. In 1994, the year after the Brady Act’s passage, Ravalli
County’s electorate voted by more than a 2-to-1 margin for Sen. Conrad Burns, who opposed the Brady
Act. See Mont. Sec. of St., 1994 Statewide General Canvass 3, http://perma.cc/5HL4-2UYV (http://sos
.mt.gov/elections/archives/1990s/1994/94GEN/1994gen.pdf) (updated Dec. 10, 1999). In 1996, Presi-
dent Bill Clinton, who signed the Brady Act, went on to win only 31% of the vote in Ravalli County.
See Mont. Sec. of St., 1996 Statewide General Canvass 3, http://perma.cc/8KEY-LJBZ (http://sos.mt
.gov/elections/archives/1990s/1996/96GEN/1996gen.pdf) (updated Dec. 10, 1999).
71. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602–2603.
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At times some justices are more sensitive to the various political of-
fices and interests that each lay claim to the title of “state.” In New York,
where the (separately elected) state Attorney General sued notwithstanding
the fact “[a] Deputy Commissioner of the State’s Energy Office testified in
favor of the Act” and “Senator Moynihan of New York spoke in support of
the Act on the floor of the Senate,” the Court held a “departure from the
constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the ‘consent’ of state officials.”75
In United States v. Comstock,76 29 states appeared as amici to support the
federal civil commitment law at issue, which not coincidentally assumed
the financial burden of civil commitment from the states.77 In dissent, Jus-
tice Thomas reiterated that federal power “does not expand merely to suit
the States’ policy preferences, or to allow State officials to avoid difficult
choices regarding the allocation of state funds.”78
In both of these cases the analysis would have benefitted from an ac-
knowledgement that it was not simply “state officials” who consented due
to their policy preferences, but a polyphony of separately elected state exec-
utive and legislative officials whose views of “the [s]tates’ policy prefer-
ences” might just work at cross-purposes.79 The Court’s neglect of the
choices the states themselves have made in structuring their governments
(that is, the people speaking through the state offices they have constituted
and filled through elections) is at least disrespectful, and at most a self-
defeating form of dual sovereignty that refuses to hear the voices of the
state through which its own citizens chose to speak on particular issues.
Take, for example, the Medicaid expansion in the aftermath of the Su-
preme Court’s NFIB decision. Scholars, including the contributors to this
issue, debate which mode of federalism is or ought to be dominant in our
constitutional system. Heather Gerken helpfully classifies them: “the de
jure autonomy associated with the sovereignty account; the de facto auton-
omy associated with process federalism; and the power of the servant,
which is the best way to conceptualize state power in cooperative federal
regimes.”80 In the legal and political debate over Medicaid expansion, all
three modes play out in every state. On the campaign trail, process (or polit-
ical safeguards) federalism dominates as federal and state officials position
themselves for or against the federal policy. This positioning includes both
75. N.Y., 505 U.S. at 181–182.
76. U.S. v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126 (2010).
77. Id. at 179 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
79. But see N.Y., 505 U.S. at 200 (White, J., dissenting in part) (noting “to say, as the Court does,
that the incursion on state sovereignty ‘cannot be ratified by the “consent” of state officials,’ is flatly
wrong,” and arguing that the State should be estopped from challenging a federal law from which it
derived substantial advantages).
80. Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1549, 1552 (2012).
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Attorneys General (because they are empowered to challenge the federal
policy in court) and state legislators and Governors (because they might be
empowered to reject the federal policy in the statehouse). At the courthouse,
dual sovereignty claims dominate as the challenging states ask the Supreme
Court to police the federal government’s trespass beyond its delegated pow-
ers into the state sphere of reserved powers. In the wake of the split decision
on the Affordable Care Act, states revert (with the Court’s blessing) to a
cooperative federalism model of negotiation and implementation of federal
policy on the states’ terms.
The diverse configurations of policy choices within states on the issue
make it difficult to discern a “state’s” choice in anything more than a formal
sense. Take the vast differences in political dynamics that frame states’
choices whether or not to expand Medicaid in the aftermath of NFIB, sum-
marized in Figure 1. Seventeen states are “winners”: their executive81 sued
for the right to avoid the Medicaid expansion, and their legislature opted
out; still, three of those states elected Congressional delegations that sup-
ported the Affordable Care Act in one or both houses. Eighteen states were
“losers”: their executive did not sue, and their legislature opted in; of
course, these states were losers only in the litigation, because only one of
their Congressional delegations opposed the Affordable Care Act, and prob-
81. Reinforcing the status of each state as a “they” not an “it,” most states acted through their
Attorney General, typically the independently elected constitutional officer with “a significant degree of
autonomy” and “wide discretion in making the determination as to the public interest” in representing
the State. See State of Fla. ex rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 268–269 (5th Cir. 1976)
(recounting the broad common law powers of the state attorney general). Iowa, Mississippi, and Nevada
were represented by their Governors despite the Attorneys’ General independent legal status and duties
under state law. See Iowa Const. art. V, § 12; Miss. Const. art. 6, § 173; Nev. Const. art. 5, § 19.
Wyoming’s Governor also appeared in the case on behalf of his state instead of its Attorney General,
who is appointed by the Governor and serves at his pleasure. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9–1–601 (2015);
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9–1–202 (2015). The Supreme Court took no note of this distinction. See NFIB, 132
S. Ct. at 2576 (listing each state representative who appeared in the case). The only mention of state
Attorney General standing in the Health Care Cases arose in Florida’s challenge to the individual man-
date, when the district court held “[t]he States of Idaho and Utah, through plaintiff Attorneys General
Lawrence G. Wasden and Mark L. Shurtleff, have standing to prosecute this case based on statutes duly
passed by their legislatures, and signed into law by their Governors.” Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept.
of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1272 (N.D. Fla.). Therefore it was unnecessary to
consider the standing of other state plaintiffs (including those represented by their governors). See id;
but see Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that not even a state
Attorney General had standing to challenge the individual mandate). On the other side of the case,
Iowa’s Attorney General actually represented Iowa (already purportedly a party on the opposing side) in
an amicus brief supporting Medicaid expansion, in which Washington’s governor appeared instead of
that state’s Attorney General. See Amici Curiae Br. of the States of Oregon et al., State of Fla. v. Dept.
Health & Human Servs., http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/su-
preme_court_preview/briefs/11-400_respondents_amcu_states.authcheckdam.pdf (Nos. 11-393, 11-398,
11-400, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)). Notably the state Attorneys General recognized the state separation of
powers issue and listed Washington’s Governor as appearing in her official capacity as Governor, but
not a representative capacity as the state itself. See id. at 1.
16
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ably would not have dreamt of a result in which their states’ Medicaid ex-
pansion was paid in part with tax dollars from other states that opted out.
Ten states were “choosers”: their executive sued, and their legislature opted
in anyway; these states also enjoyed a sweet deal, spending their co-plain-
tiffs’ tax dollars on the Medicaid expansion they once united to oppose,
even though nearly every one of these states supported the Affordable Care
Act in at least one house of Congress. Finally there were five states, includ-
ing Montana, which sat out of both the challenge and (so far) the Medicaid
expansion; their inactivity is misleading, however, since in these states the
politics of the Affordable Care Act played a significant role in campaigns
for state offices.82
82. See, e.g., Erik C. Anderson, Bucy, Fox trade jabs, ads in high-stakes AG race, The Madisonian
http://perma.cc/Z2SF-MNTD (http://www.madisoniannews.com/bucy-fox-trade-jabs-ads-in-high-stakes-
ag-race/) (Oct. 11, 2012) (Montana Attorney General candidate Pam Bucy “blasted [candidate Tim]
Fox’s focus on the federal health care law, saying it has overshadowed discussion of the office’s princi-
pal duties,” while Fox “defends his focus on Obamacare” and would have joined the state Attorneys
General in the challenge to the Act); Andy Sher, GOP wants AG hopefuls quizzed on ACA support,
Chattanooga Times Free Press http://perma.cc/PKG9-F65T (http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/local/
story/2014/sep/07/gop-wants-ag-hopefuls-quizzed-on-aca-support/266513/) (Sept. 7, 2014) (noting
“conservative criticism of current [Tennessee] Attorney General Bob Cooper, a Democrat and Chatta-
nooga native who did not join the anti-Obamacare lawsuit filed by mostly Republican state attorneys
general.”).
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FIGURE 1: THE VARIED VOICES OF THE STATES
ON MEDICAID EXPANSION83
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Across this wide variety of contradictory choices within each state,
what kind of accountability could possibly emerge? Is there more accounta-
bility in the “chooser” states whose Attorneys General led the charge
against the Affordable Care Act, after their Congressional delegations voted
for the Act and before their statehouses gladly signed up under the Act once
the constitutional dust settled? Or is there more accountability in the “loser”
states whose Congressional delegations, Attorneys General, and statehouses
all supported the Act even before NFIB brought them a windfall of subsi-
dies from the opt-out states’ tax dollars. Can the “winner” states, those that
have stood on principled opposition to the Act from the Capitol to the court-
house to the statehouse, and now are seeing their tax dollars go to their
political and legal opponent states, really be considered winners at all?
What about the apparently passive states that neither challenged the Act nor
implemented its Medicaid expansion, states that like others were buffeted
by aggressive campaigns that sought to hold state attorneys general, legisla-
tors, and governors “accountable” in state elections for what was originally
a vote by their Congressional delegations for or against the Act? The
Court’s decision in NFIB may be a victory for an anti-coercion rule of fed-
eralism, but any claim of another victory for accountability (the principle
that supports the anti-coercion rule) is incoherent. Instead, the constitutional
controversy over the Affordable Care Act presented one opportunity after
another for state and federal officials to pass the buck back and forth from
branch to branch.84
83. “Delegation Votes For” (or “Against”) includes state delegations in which a majority of mem-
bers of both the Senate and House delegations voted yea (or nay), or in cases of a tie in one delegation, a
majority of members of the other delegation voted yea (or nay) on H.R. 3590 (111th Cong.). Delegation
splits include state delegations in which a majority of members in the Senate and House delegations
voted differently, or both delegations tied. “Executive Challenges” (and “Does Not Challenge”) includes
those states that did (or did not) appear as petitioners challenging the Act in NFIB. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct.
at 2576 (listing each state representative who appeared in the case). Italics denote the state’s governor
was party to the challenge instead of the state’s attorney general (Wyoming’s attorney general serves at
its governor’s pleasure). Underline denotes the state filed an amicus curiae brief opposing the challenge
(every state appeared through its attorney general except Washington, whose governor appeared in her
official capacity). See Amici Curiae Br. of the States of Oregon et al., State of Fla. v. Dept. Health &
Human Servs., http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/
briefs/11-400_respondents_amcu_states.authcheckdam.pdf (Nos. 11-393, 11-398, 11-400, 132 S. Ct.
2566 (2012)). “Legislature Supports” (or “Does Not Support”) includes those states that have adopted
(or not adopted as of March 6, 2015) the Medicaid Expansion. See Kaiser Family Foundation, Status of
State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, http://perma.cc/8KVP-X8UN (http://kff.org/health-
reform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/) (ac-
cessed Mar. 15, 2015). An asterisk (*) denotes states whose governors have proposed Medicaid expan-
sion. See id.
84. See Roderick Hills, The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy
Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 813, 828 (1998) (“The difficulty with
such political accountability arguments is that they overlook the complexity inherent in any system of
federalism that always has the potential to confuse voters and thereby undermine political accountabil-
ity.”).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Federalism looks different from the states’ and tribes’ perspectives.
Long before and long after the Supreme Court expounds its view of the
states’ integrity, dignity, and sovereignty in any particular case,85 the states
themselves oppose, choose, and cooperate with federal policies from the
statehouse all the way down to the county commission. These engagements
with federalism arise from complex interactions within the states them-
selves, according to their own distinct governmental structures that are as
much an expression of their sovereignty as anything they might do to resist
federal policy. States, like the federal system itself, are polyphonic. It may
be difficult for the federal government, including its courts, to discern any
true voice of a state. As the contributions to this issue show, states typically
do not speak with just one voice. To the contrary, many voices speak for
each state. Within the political structures the state has chosen, each of those
voices may be authoritative in its own way. Courts and constitutional ana-
lysts have much to learn from listening to each of the voices that speak for
the states in federalism’s continuing conversations.
85. See e.g. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364.
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